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CHAPTER 18 
Insurance 
FRANKLIN J. MARRYOTT 
The high degree of public interest in the institution of private 
insurance continues to be reflected in Massachusetts, as elsewhere 
throughout the country, by the number of legislative bills introduced 
or enacted which would regulate this "constructive corollary to enter-
prise." At the same time, the satisfactory ratio between the large 
number of opportunities for conflict between insurance carriers and 
their policyholders or beneficiaries and the relatively small number of 
insurance cases being submitted to the courts for solution is reflected 
in the rather sparse crop of judicial decisions involving insurance 
law. 
The 1954 legislature considered almost 300 bills having to do with 
insurance. But the Supreme Judicial Court rendered only seven de-
cisions involving insurance law, apart from automobile or workmen's 
compensation cases merely involving questions of liability of policy-
holders or the extent of damages or benefits. 
A. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
§18.1. Financing automobile insurance premiums. While in many 
states legislative attention in recent years has tended to focus on the 
question of what to do about uninsured motorists, in Massachusetts 
that problem seems virtually quiescent because of the presence here of 
the only broad-scale compulsory automobile liability insurance law 
in the country, in spite of some gaps in the compulsory scheme. Here 
specific problems which develop out of the fact that insurance is com-
pulsory or out of established habits of handling such insurance are 
more apt to be grist for the legislative mill. A case in point is the mat-
ter of financing premiums for automobile insurance. 
For years, agents and brokers had considered themselves unaffected 
by the small loans law,! since that statute exempts from its scope trans-
actions which involve evidences of indebtedness of a buyer to the 
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seller. Thus, when the Commissioner of Banks, late in October, 1953, 
held that the "seller" of insurance was the insurance company rather 
than the agent, there was reason for consternation among those 
agents who customarily provide automobile insurance financing serv-
ices for their clients. There was talk of some 400,000 motorists be-
ing off the highways because of inability to secure acceptable financing 
in time to buy insurance for the January 1, 1954, effective date of all 
compulsory motor vehicle insurance policies. The solution was found 
in Chapter 464 of the Acts of 1954, which added Se:tion 162B to 
Chapter 175 of the General Laws. Under the new leg:slation agents 
and brokers are treated as sellers of insurance for the purpose of 
financing insurance premiums. They may accept payment of insur-
ance premiums in installments to be evidenced by notes running to the 
agent, and may charge rates fixed as equitable and nondiscriminatory 
after public hearing by a board comprising the Attorney General, the 
Commissioner of Insurance, and the Commissioner of Banks, or desig-
nated employees in those departments. 
§18.2. Agents' and brokers' "service charges" under the assigned 
risk program. The problem of the unwanted insurance customer has 
become more acute in all sections of the country. This is a by-prod-
uct of the spread and increased effectiveness of modern automobile 
financial responsibility laws, which have the effect of virtually com-
pelling poor drivers to become insured. It would seem that the 
problem will continue so long as administrators of motor vehicle laws 
continue to be reluctant to deny the use of the highways to those driv-
ers whom insurance companies would prefer not to insure. The work-
ing solution has been to create "assigned risk plans" for apportioning 
these risks among insurance carriers. That the insurance carriers have 
been willing to accept such undesirable customers under any circum-
stances is a sign of their keen awareness of the near indispensability of 
the automobile to many persons and of the responsibilities which this 
situation has thrust upon the insurance carriers. 
A small but not to be ignored facet of this problem is the matter of 
compensating the insurance agents or brokers who render valuable help 
to those in need of the facilities of the assigned risk plan. While the 
plan filed under the statute! provides for modest commissions to the 
agent or broker of record, the making of additional "service charges" 
was widespread. To regulate such service charges legislation was en-
acted.2 The Commissioner of Insurance is required to fix and estab-
lish a schedule of fair and reasonable service charges, together with 
enabling rules and regulations. 
§18.3. Availability of medical reports. A loosely drawn amend-
ment! to the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Law requires any 
company issuing a motor vehicle liability insurance policy, which 
§IB.2. 1 G.L., c. 175, §U3H, added by Acts of 1953, c. 570, §5. 
• Acts of 1954, c. 274. 
§IB.3. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 334. 
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makes a medical examination of a person injured in an automobile 
accident, to furnish copies of the medical reports upon request. 
The injured party is placed under a corresponding duty with respect 
to treatment and examination by the attending physician. 
Apart from the general looseness stemming from failure to refer to 
written requests, absence of time limitations, etc., it is curious to find 
what would normally be a matter of legal procedure cropping up in 
the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Law. How and by whom is 
this to be enforced - the courts or the Insurance Commissioner? Is 
it intended that this apply only to accidents in the future or is there a 
retroactive intent? Why separate treatment for accidents involving 
compulsory coverage? 
B. ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
§18.4. Uniform law on accident and health policy provisions: Back-
ground. During the survey year the most noteworthy enactment per-
taining to this rapidly growing and problem-creating field of insur-
ance was the adoption of the Uniform Individual Accident and Sick-
ness Policy Provisions Law.! 
Uniform legislation in this field goes back to 1911. In that year a 
committee of insurance lawyers was created to devise action corrective 
of bad claim practices reported to have been engaged in by a few 
companies. The committee recommended model legislation,2 which 
became law, often with modifications, in twenty-seven states and the 
District of Columbia. The theory of the law was that abuses in claim 
practices could be corrected by requiring the policy to be printed in 
type of satisfactory size and to contain, "in the words and in the order" 
of the statute, certain required provisions. Massachusetts never en-
acted this law as such, although its statute,S enacted in 1910, had im-
posed many of the same requirements, but called for only "in sub-
stance" compliance rather than verbatim reproduction. 
Because of the modifications with which the model law was often 
enacted and because of variations in state requirements made possi-
ble under "in substance" laws, it became difficult to design a policy 
form for nation-wide use. Sometimes the necessity for complying 
with such a multiplicity of requirements hindered the development 
of new policies. Thus efforts were made to obtain greater flexibility 
and greater uniformity in state laws. 
§18.5. Uniform law on accident and health policies: New model 
law. The efforts toward improvement culminated in new model legis-
lation called the Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy 
Provision Law. It was approved by the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners in 1950 and is now law in thirty-three states and 
§18.4. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 275. 
• It was known as the Standard Provisions Law for Accident and Health Insurance 
Policies. 
• G.L., c. 175, §108, added by Acts of 1910, c. 493. 
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the District of Columbia. It is this law which Massachusetts enacted 
in 1954 - with modifications.! 
The new model law covers much the same ground as the older 
law. There is, however, an important difference in approach, 
namely, that the "in substance" concept, long prevalent in Massachu-
setts, rather than the "in the words and in the order" concept, has 
been adopted. Significant substantive changes include the addition 
of an incontestable clause as a required provision (the Massachusetts 
variation changes the period from three to two years), a mandatory 
provision for a grace period, the elimination of the requirement for a 
"brief description" (Massachusetts retains something akin to a request 
for a brief description because it requires a reference to the schedule 
of benefits on the filing back of the policy), and a change in the type 
face requirements. Under the old law, exceptions, exclusions, and re-
ductions are to be printed in larger type than other provisions. U n-
der the new law, no "undue prominence" may be given to any por-
tion of the text. 
Perhaps it is inescapable that espousal of a theory of statutory regu-
lation of the form of insurance contract carries with it the means 
whereby the approach becomes self-defeating, certainly in so far as the 
objectives of uniformity are involved, because of the inevitability of the 
development of numerous variations. But if the objective is to assure 
that the business remain reasonably free of a type of regulation which 
might seriously interfere with rate and forms competition or with de-
sirable and vigorous growth, this is probably secured to a degree be-
cause apparently there is some tendency to rely upon a standard 
provisions law as sufficient, thus avoiding more confining regulation. 
That the new model law will do more for the policyholder, by way of 
assuring fairness in policy provisions relating to formal and proce-
dural matters, than was done by the old is clear. But since this ap-
proach to the problem of regulation does not concern itself at all with 
the matter of reasonableness of the price to be paid, some may be re-
minded of the remark, attributed to Solon, that laws are like cobwebs 
for " ... if any trifling or powerless thing falls into them, they hold 
it fast, while if it is something weightier it breaks through them and 
is off." 
C. CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE POLICY 
PROVISIONS 
§18.6. Automobile liability policy: Cooperation clause. Several 
opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court interpret provisions of insur-
ance policies. In Williams v. Travelers Insurance Co.,! the cooperation 
§18.5. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 275. From the standpoint of the people responsible for 
drafting policy forms, the value of these modifications is questionable, for they, and 
those insisted upon by other states, tend to make impossible the objective of uni-
formity of policy provisions and constructions thereof. 
§18.6. 1330 Mass. 476, 115 N.E.2d 378 (1953). 
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clause of the automobile policy was considered. Compulsory insur-
ance was not involved since the accident happened "off the ways." 
The company denied coverage because the insured gave a materially 
different version of the accident to the investigator than he gave at the 
trial. The Court, in upholding the finding below that the company 
was prejudiced and that the clause was breached by intentionally false 
testimony at the trial, is in accord with the usual view. The com-
ment to the effect that the furnishing of information known to be 
false and of a material nature "either before or at the trial" would 
be a breach seems not entirely necessary to the decision but foreshad-
ows a rejection in Massachusetts of the view held in some states that a 
breach does not occur if the testimony at the trial is true even if the 
prior statements were false,2 on the basis that public policy is to en-
courage telling the truth at the trial, regardless of prior falsehoods. 
Logic would seem to be with the Massachusetts view. 
§18.7. Compulsory automobile liability policy: An injury "upon 
the ways." The case of Desmarais v. Standard Accident Insurance Co.,! 
appears to be the first case making a clean-cut decision that an acci-
dent in which a person injured "off the ways" by being struck by a ve-
hicle partly upon and partly off the highway is covered under the 
compulsory automobile liability insurance policy. Since the policy it-
self seems clear in covering liability for injuries, wherever sustained, 
caused by operation of the motor vehicle upon the ways, the real point 
would seem to be that "upon the ways" means " ... partially at least 
upon a public way." 2 
The Court distinguished Santa Maria v. Trotto,S since that case 
turned upon the correctness of a requested instruction that the ques-
tion of illegal registration is immaterial where the plaintiff is not a 
traveler on the highway, is treated as "not followed" to the extent that 
it may be inconsistent. Another early case, Milliman v. Coulter,4 in-
volved an accident in which a person off the highway was struck by a 
vehicle which may have been partially on and partially off the way. 
That case did not, however, involve construction of the compulsory 
automobile insurance law or the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Policy. 
§18.8. Boiler and machinery policy: Coverage of "sudden and ac-
cidental breaking." The Court was called upon in New England Gas 
& Electric Assn. v. Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp.l to decide 
whether the cracking of a turbine spindle of a generator was an "acci-
dent" covered by a boiler and machinery policy. 
The policy covered loss of property directly damaged by accident 
and defined "accident" as "a sudden and accidental breaking, deform-
• Cases are collected in Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §4773 (1948). 
§18.7. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 221, lI8 N.E.2d 86. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 224, 225, lI8 N.E.2d at 89. 
B 297 Mass. 442, 9 N.E.2d 540 (1937). 
'301 Mass. 320, 17 N.E.2d 162 (1938). 
§18.8. '330 Mass. 640, lI6 N.E.2d 671 (1953). 
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ing, burning out or rupturing" of the property insured. The actual 
breakdown of the spindle appeared to have been due to incorrect ten-
sion caused by misalignment of the spindle on its bearings, which, in 
turn, was brought about by an incorrect setting of a bank of springs 
supporting the condenser. The setting of the springs was done in 
July, 1946, and the breakdown occurred in June, 1947. 
The word "accident" in insurance policies has often been the occa-
sion of difficulty. Most decisions have dealt with the construction of 
the word in connection with accident and health insurance policies 
and double indemnity clauses of life insurance policies, and Massachu-
setts law has been primarily concerned with whether the policy re-
quirement was that the loss had been accidentally caused as opposed 
to being an accidental result.2 
In the instant case the words of the policy "sudden and accidental" 
modify "breaking, etc." and describe a result rather than the means, 
and the Court had no trouble in distinguishing earlier cases. Even 
though the spring setting was intentional and so not accidental as to 
means, it was not done with intent to damage the turbine, and even if 
it had been negligent, it would not have detracted from the accidental 
quality of the result. The cracking of the spindle was an accident as 
the term is generally understood. The word "sudden" as used in 
the policy required that the result, not the cause, be sudden. Thus, 
though the turbine had been operated for nearly a year and the 
cnanges in the molecular structure of the spindle which resulted in 
cracking were occurring throughout this period, nevertheless the 
Court, relying on the primary meaning given to the word by lexicog-
raphers, said that the result was "sudden" in that it happened with-
out previous notice and occurred unexpectedly. 
This appears to be the first case in Massachusetts discussing this par-
ticular aspect of the accident problem. It is particularly interesting in 
view of its application to property damage. Similar cases have been 
decided in other jurisdictions involving bodily injury claims.s In these 
cases the question of whether or not injury is accidentally caused is 
determined from the viewpoint of the person injured and hence the 
element of suddenness is supplied by the awareness of injury. 
Two cases in other jurisdictions involving property damage under 
policies similar to that in the instant case reached opposite conclusions 
on this point. In the first, City of Detroit Lakes v. Travelers Indem-
nity CO.,4 the sudden rupturing of a steam boiler, even though causa-
tive factors may have been slow and gradual, was held an accident. 
The jury verdict was regarded as within the ambit of reasonable in-
ference. In the second, Cornell Wood Products Co. v. Hartford Steam 
2 Smith v. Travelers Insurance Co., 219 Mass. 147, 106 N.E. 607 (1914); Henderson 
v. Travelers Insurance Co., 262 Mass. 522, 160 N.E. 415, 56 A.L.R. 1088 (1928). In 
these cases the policies covered injuries effected through "accidental means." 
• See, e.g., Canadian Radium & Chromium Corp. v. Indemnity Co. of North Amer-
ica, 411 III. 325, 104 N.E.2d 250 (1%1). 
• 201 Minn. 26, 275 N .W. 371 (1939). 
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Boiler Inspection CO.)5 damage caused by the swelling of wedges on a 
generator due to sixty hours' submersion in water was held not to be 
sudden or accidental. The instant case seems to imply that in Massa-
chusetts, evidence of gradual accumulation of effects will not be suffi-
cient to negative a finding of accident. 
§18.9. Group insurance: Insurers writing insurance for their own 
employees. As a result of statutory changes in 1954, both group life 
insurance and group accident and health insurance may be written by 
the insurance company which employs the persons covered by the pol-
iey.1 Previously, life insurance companies could write such group life 
insurance contracts, but only if a contributory plan was involved. 
While the practical wisdom of permitting such arrangements seems 
unassailable, the net effect, which is to permit a corporation to make a 
contract with itself, is on first glance a bit bizarre. But corporations 
have become such complex creatures that the practical necessity of oc-
casionally allowing them to "wear two hats" at the same time does not 
seem very shocking. Actually, all that is involved, certainly as to acci-
dent and health benefits, is allowing an insurance company employer 
to do for its employees, through pieces of paper it is used to using, 
what other employers can do for their employees by using other pieces 
of paper to provide the legal structure under which employee bene-
fits are furnished. 
§18.10. Group insurance: Coverage extended. A slight broadening 
in the description of groups eligible for group accident and health 
coverage was made by statute in 1954.1 Standing alone this is of small 
general importance, but must be oriented with the marked growth of 
this form of coverage and the bearing that such growth has upon the 
problem of governmental action in the field of accident and sickness 
insurance. 
D. LIFE INSURANCE 
§18.11. Effective date: Age of the applicant. For over forty years 
Massachusetts has prohibited the issue or delivery in the Common-
wealth of a policy of life or endowment insurance which purports to be 
issued or effective at an age lower than the age of the applicant at his 
birthday nearest the time of the application.! This rule is now modi-
fied.2 Today the prohibition runs to dating the policy more than six 
months before the application date if thereby the applicant would rate 
at an age younger than his age at the birthday nearest the time of the 
application. The rule as to annuities remains at the nearest birthday, 
• 62 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill. 1945). 
§18.9. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 75 (group life); id., c. 247 (group accident and health). 
§18.1O. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 327. 
§18.l1. 1 C.L., c. 175, §130. 
2 Acts of 1954, c. 66. 
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that is, annuities must take effect at an age no higher than the age of the 
applicant at his nearest birthday. But life insurance may take effect at 
an age no lower than the age of the applicant at a date up to six 
months prior to the application. 
Apparently, there is some sales appeal in giving the applicant a 
choice of paying a lower rate for the future if he will pay back to an 
early effective date. 
As a general rule, it is competent for the parties to an insurance 
contract to agree that it shall be antedated.3 Where antedating has 
been regarded as an evil it has been on the basis that insureds were 
being deceived into thinking that they got something for nothing,4 
whereas in fact the company was getting a premium for a period dur-
ing which it had no obligation under the contract. Of course, the re-
duction in the amount of the annual premium is valid consideration 
for the antedating. 
§18.12. Group insurance: Incontestable clause clarified. Massa-
chusetts has long provided that policies of group life insurance must 
contain a provision that the policy shall be incontestable after two 
years from its date of issue.1 (There are some exceptions.) But does 
this mean that the policy is incontestable as to the employer only? Or 
that the insurance on any member of the group is incontestable after 
two years? 
The rewritten first paragraph of the Act Relative to the Incontest-
able Clause2 provides that the insurance on any person insured under 
the group policy shall be incontestable after two years (with certain 
exceptions). Presumably, insurance on any person in the group is 
contestable within two years of the effective date of the insurance as to 
that person. This seems fair enough, considering the increasingly 
large amounts of insurance in force on members of groups and the 
beneficent results of the continuing growth of this type of insurance. 
The courts generally seem to apply a rather strict construction 
against the company to incontestable clauses in group contracts. In 
Allison v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.3 it was held that the insurer could 
not succeed with a defense that the employee was not in active service 
at the time the insurance was to take effect, even though the policy 
provided that the insurance was to be effective only if the employee 
was in active service. The view taken was that the question went to 
329 Am. Jur., Insurance §219. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §104 (1948). 
In Massachusetts, see 8 Ops. Atty. Cen. 459 (1928). As to the relationship between 
problems of the incontestable clause (C.L., c. 175, §132, cl. 2) and antedating, see also 
Note, 31 A.L.R. 102 (1924). 
• See N.Y. Insurance Dept. note to 1937 Revision of the N.Y. Insurance Laws. New 
York now has a statute (Insurance Laws §156) similar to the new Massachusetts 
provision. The New York statute contains an explicit statement that policies issued 
in violation thereof are not invalidated. In Massachusetts, C.L., c. 175, §193 is to the 
same effect. 
§18.12. 1 C.L., c. 175, §134, cl. 1. 
2 Acts of 1954, c. 285. 
3158 So. 389 (La. App. 1935). 
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validity rather than coverage. The incontestable clause is not, of 
course, aimed at changing the coverage, but only at preventing ques-
tions of validity being raised at a later date, thus presenting the bene-
ficiary with a lawsuit instead of the proceeds. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Florence4 and John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Dorman5 both involved defenses that the 
claimant's decedent was not an employee and both held such a de-
fense to be barred after the period had passed. But in Rasmussen v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Society,6 where the policy excluded employ-
ees over forty years of age and the defense was that the employee was 
over forty, the exclusion was sustained as affecting coverage. 
§18.13. Participating policies clarified. Chapter 318 of the Acts 
of 1954, amending Section 149 of Chapter 175 of the General Laws, 
makes clear that domestic life insurance companies which issue indi-
vidual participating accident and health policies may also issue life 
insurance contracts on a nonparticipating basis. The need for amend-
ment arose because, literally read, the section seemed to say that if the 
company issues any participating policies of any description, it must 
issue all its life or endowment policies on a full participating basis. 
Freeing domestic companies of either charter power or mere polic-
ing restrictions which do not apply to companies from other states 
would seem to be highly desirable unless the restrictions contribute in 
some substantial way to the benefit of the company or its policyhold-
ers. No such benefit appears to result from old Section 149. 
§18.14. Writing down real estate investments. A new enactmentl 
gives greater flexibility to life insurance companies in writing down 
the value of certain real estate held for investment purposes. Under 
the previous law, the write-off could not be less than 2 percent each 
year. A write-off is now permitted that will average not less than 2 
percent per year, thus permitting a high rate of write-off which might 
be desirable in income-producing years and a rate lower than 2 per-
cent in later years. 
§18.15. Court decisions. Two 1954 decisions of the Supreme Judi-
cial Court involving life insurance should be mentioned here. In the 
first case, Taylor v. Sanderson,l it was held, following other cases, that 
where the beneficiary under an annuity policy predeceases the annui-
tant, his share of the proceeds goes to the annuitant's estate, not to 
the beneficiary'S. In each of the two contracts involved in the case, 
there is a blank to designate beneficiaries, followed by the printed 
words "if living." Elsewhere in the form is a provision for payment 
to the annuitant's estate if no beneficiary is living. In Kruger v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance CO.,2 decided in 1937, it had been 
'47 Ga. App. 711,171 S.E. 317 (1933). 
5108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1939). 
• 293 Mich. 482, 292 N.W. 377 (1940). 
§18.14. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 68. 
§18.15. '330 Mass. 616. 116 N.E.2d 269 (1953). 
• 298 Mass. 124, 10 N.E.2d 97. 
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held that a designation of two beneficiaries followed by the words "if 
living" required payment to the insured's estate of the share of the 
dead beneficiary. In the first of the contracts involved in the Taylor 
case, however, there was a change of beneficiaries designated on an en-
dorsement without the words "if living." In the second, the blank was 
filled by a reference to an endorsement, the words "if living" were 
stricken through, and the endorsement contained no requirement of 
survivorship. The endorsement on the first contract merely established 
new fill-ins in the blank, without altering the printed "if living" clause. 
As to the second contract, the Court alluded to the draftsmanship rea-
sons for striking out "if living," to the absence of any showing that the 
annuitant had asked to have the clause stricken, and to the retention 
of the other provision requiring payment to the annuitant's estate if 
no beneficiary were living as indicating an intent to exclude the estate 
of deceased beneficiaries. 
In the second 1954 case, Callahan v. John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Co.,s the premium on a life insurance policy was due "on or 
before" January 21 of each year. It was held that where the insured 
died on January 21, the company was entitled to the premium due 
"on or before" that day. The familiar rule that the law takes no ac-
count of a fraction of a day was held applicable, and Bouvier v. Crafts-
man Insurance CO.,4 which held the company liable for an injury oc-
curring late in the day of February 1 under a policy for which the 
plaintiff paid a premium "which will carry the insurance . . . until 
February 1 ... " was regarded as not controlling. 
E. MISCELLANEOUS 
§18.16. Boiler and machinery insurance: Inspections. To keep 
losses at a minimum boiler and machinery insurance companies have 
normally spent a large percentage of their premium income in inspec-
tions of the boilers and machinery they insure. The skills thus devel-
oped and accumulated in the staffs of these institutions engendered 
demands for their services in connection with inspections of objects 
which are not insured and not in the hands of the ultimate buyer of 
the machine. Thus there developed a practice of performing, for a 
fee, inspections of boilers and other machines in the hands of dealers 
or manufacturers. These inspections had as the end result the ability 
of the manufacturer or dealer to state that the machinery conformed 
to the standards of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. 
Legislation1 in Massachusetts in 1954 makes an express grant of this 
authority to conduct inspections of boiler machinery and apparatus 
whether or not insured by the company. The statute was enacted to 
put at rest any question of the corporate power of such an insurance 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 629, 120 N.E.2d 640. 
• 300 Mass. 5, 13 N.E.2d 619 (1938). 
§18.l6. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 266 
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company to do and to charge for work which may not be, under a 
narrow view, incidental to the powers which the corporation possesses. 
§18.17. Corporate insurance agents: Writing own coverage. The 
general rule is that an agent is without power to issue a policy cover-
ing his own property,l even where his interest is partial or incomplete.2 
In Massachusetts an application of the rule is found in Section 174 of 
Chapter 175 of the General Laws, which forbids a corporate agency to 
place insurance on its stockholders. This is now relaxed by 1954 leg-
islation3 to the extent of permitting such placements where the premi-
ums do not exceed 2 percent of the total premiums written by the 
corporate agency. 
Probably it is wise to settle these matters, but one wonders whether 
the practice here explicitly authorized might not be regarded as per-
missible, even in the face of prohibition, since a mere nominal interest 
in the property insured has usually been held insufficient to disqualify 
the agent. 4 In any event, it would seem that policies issued in viola-
tion of the statute would be merely voidable.5 Of course, this would 
be small comfort to the corporate agency officers when the question of 
punishment is involved. The usual formidable formula of "a fine of 
not less than $100, nor more than $1000, or by imprisonment for not 
more than 30 days or both," 6 probably furnished reason enough for 
seeking the legislative blessing. 
§18.18. Investments of insurance companies. Several enactments 
of the legislature in 1954 affect the powers of insurance companies in 
the investment of funds. They are briefly described in this section. 
Domestic insurance companies are authorizedl to make or acquire 
loans guaranteed or insured under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act 
of 1944. Parking rights, purchase options, liens for nondelinquent 
taxes, and assessments are added to the list of things that are not 
deemed encumbrances within the meaning of the requirements that 
loans of domestic companies be upon "unencumbered" real prop-
erty.2 
Fraternal benefit societies are granted an additional outlet for in-
vestment funds, namely, stock of a Massachusetts trust company or a 
national banking association incorporated under federal law or lo-
cated in New England.3 Some restrictions running to investments by 
domestic life insurance companies in Massachusetts voluntary associa-
tions and trusts have been removed.4 
§18.l7. '29 Am. Jur., Insurance §100. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Acts of 1954, c. 294. 
• Note, 83 A.L.R. 1520 (1933). 
• 29 Am. J lIr., InslIrance §102. 
• G.L., c. 175, §174. 
§18.18. 1 Acts of 1954, c. 176. 
2 Id., c. (ir,. 
a Tel.. c. 203. 
• hi., \-. Ill. 
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These amendments seem merely a means of adjusting the statutes to 
the changing times rather than indicating any trend toward a revision 
of the basic philosophy, now well imbedded in the insurance statutes 
of the country, that investments are to be closely regulated. One 
seldom hears any grumbling about the substantial interference with 
managerial exercise of investment powers which is involved in the 
statutory plan. Perhaps this acquiescence reflects mere passive accept-
ance of things as they are or possibly some memories are long enough 
to recall the serious abuses disclosed by the Armstrong Committee5 in 
1906. Delicate problems almost always associated with the likelihood 
that members of the boards of insurance companies are also important 
and influential in other areas of business life are perhaps made less 
troublesome by detailed regulation of investment activities. The mak-
ing of investment decisions by men of affairs with broad and far-flung 
activities sometimes generates suspicion of self-interest motivations 
even if the sense of trusteeship is sustained at a satisfactorily high 
level. 
§IS.19. Regulation of fraternal benefit societies. While, strictly 
speaking, fraternal benefit societies are not insurance companies, prin-
ciples of insurance law govern many of their relationships with mem-
bers and beneficiaries. It seems probable that as fraternal insurance 
societies place relatively greater emphasis upon the insurance rather 
than the ritualistic and social aspects of their work, additional regula-
tion will follow. Even now there is a very substantial body of statu-
tory and case law on the general subject of fraternal and mutual 
benefit insurance. Two enactments of the 1954 legislature are illus-
trative. 
Chapter 103 of the Acts of 1954 eliminates certain restrictions on the 
amount of death benefits payable on lives of children under eighteen. 
Chapter 39S of the Acts of 1954 permits certain fraternals to con-
tract with an insurance company for the payment of benefits due un-
der the certificate of the fraternal. Previously such contracts were al-
lowed only to the primarily social societies. 
• New York State Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee. 
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